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NOTES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION: THE
SEARCH FOR A WORKABLE RULE
A majority of states have enacted statutes that encourage
commercial arbitration.' Most courts have followed the spirit of
these statutes by broadening the range of issues an arbitrator may
resolve under a standard arbitration clause 2 and by recognizing the
I See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 1972 & Gum. Supp. 1977); N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. LAw §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1976); UNIFORM ARBrTRA-
TION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1970 & Supp. 1977) (adopted in 20 states). Cf. Weinrott v. Carp, 32
N.Y.2d 190, 199, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856 (1973) (New York statute
evinces legislative intent to encourage arbitration). The United States Arbitration Act
(U.S.A.A.) (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970)) promotes arbitration of disputes subject to federaljurisdiction. On the issue of the peculiar applicability of the U.S.A.A., see note 64 infra.
Statutory enactments have been necessary to overcome judicial hostility toward arbitration.
See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984-85 (2d Cir.
1942). Professor Martin Domke lists the essential features of an effective modem arbitra-
tion statute:
1. irrevocability of any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration;
2. power of a party, pursuant to a court directive, to compel a recalcitrant party
to proceed to arbitration;
3. provision that any court action instituted in violation of an arbitration agree-
ment may be stayed until arbitration in the agreed manner has taken place;
4. authority of the court to appoint arbitrators and fill vacancies when the parties
do not make the designation, or when arbitrators withdraw or become unable
to serve during the arbitration;
5. restrictions on the court's freedom to review the findings of facts by the arbi-
trator and his application of the law;
6. specification of the grounds on which awards may be attacked for procedural
defects, and of time limits for such challenges.
M. DomE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 4.01, at 20 (1968).
'See Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174 N.E.2d 463, 464, 214
N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1961) (mutuality of obligation); Allen Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Dorado
Dress Corp., 39 App. Div. 2d 286, 287-88, 333 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (Ist Dep't 1972) (conse-
quential damages arguably barred by contract); United Buying Serv. Int'l Corp. v. United
Buying Serv., Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 75, 78-81, 327 N.Y.S.2d 7, 12-14 (1st Dep't 1971)
(consequential damages), aff'd nem., 30 N.Y.2d 822, 286 N.E.2d 284, 334 N.Y.S.2d 911
(1972). Judicial construction of the scope of an arbitration clause is usually characterized as
a determination of the "arbitrability" of a given issue. Under a modern arbitration statute(see note 1 supra), any dispute that is arbitrable is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
arbitrator. A recalcitrant party may be compelled to arbitrate, and the statute requires
courts to stay any judicial action that concerns a dispute subject to arbitration. See, e.g., N.Y.
Crv. PRAC. LAw §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
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separability of the arbitration clause from the rest of the contract.'
Moreover, modern courts have become increasingly reluctant to
disturb an arbitrator's decision on the merits.4 Nevertheless, the
relationship between courts and arbitrators is still strained by dif-
ficult cases concerning the limits of an arbitrator's power. In par-
ticular, arbitral remedies that exceed the limits of traditional con-
tract law, such as punitive damages, continue to provoke the
judiciary to ignore the statutory command: hands off the merits.5
In the past three years, New York's highest court6 has tvice
confronted the problem of the punitive power of arbitrators.
In Associated General Contractors v. Savin Brothers,7 the court con-
3 Separability of the arbitration clause allows an arbitrator to decide a claim alleging
that the entire contract is void. As long as the arbitration clause itself is not tainted (e.g., by
fraud in the execution), it stands as a separately enforceable agreement, even if the con-
tract embodying it is invalid. The separability doctrine applies to cases arising under the
U.S.A.A. (Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1966)),
and the New York arbitration statute (Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 198, 298 N.E.2d
42, 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, 855 (1973)). See generally note 1 supra. For many years, a claim
seeking to void the entire contract precluded arbitration. See Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plot-
nick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 19-20, 143 N.E.2d 366, 367, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640-41 (1957). One court
recently applied the separability concept to allow an arbitrator to determine the reasonable-
ness of a contract made by a minor. Prinze v. Jonas, 38 N.Y.2d 570, 576-77, 345 N.E.2d
295, 299-300, 381 N.Y.S.2d 824, 829-30 (1976).
4 Compare Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255
N.E.2d 168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969) (arbitrator's failure to apply contractual limit on
consequential damages held grounds for vacatur where arbitrator did not explain his
rationale), with Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 278 N.E.2d 633, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1972) (arbitrator's failure to distribute dissolved partnership's assets in accordance with
agreement not grounds for vacatur despite lack of explanation for rationale of award). See
Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960); Com-
ment, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 545 (1963);
Comment, Commercial Arbitration Under the Federal Act: Expanding the Scope of Judicial Review,
35 U. PrrT. L. REV. 799 (1974).
1 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 7501 (McKinney 1963), set but in note 17 infra. See 9 U.S.C.
§ 10 (1970) (limited grounds for judicial review of arbitration award upon motion for
judicial confirmation); UNIFORM ARBITRATION AcT § 12 (limited grounds for judicial review
of arbitration award).
6 Although this Note focuses primarily on recent New York Court of Appeals cases,
the problem raised and the solution proposed apply to all states with modern arbitration
statutes. See note 1 supra. The first state to enact a statute encouraging arbitration, New
York has been a pioneer in the development of arbitration law, providing guidance for
other states both because of the wealth of precedent it produces and because statutes in
other jurisdictions have drawn upon New York's experience. See generally M. DOMKE, supra
note 1, §§ 4.01-4.03. In many jurisdictions, the statutory provisions invoked by courts re-
viewing unusual awards-provisions dealing with initial arbitrability and judicial review
upon motion for confirmation of an award-are similar, if not identical, to New York law.
Compare N.Y. Civ. PRic. LAw §§ 7501, 7511 (McKinney 1963), with UNIFORM ARBITRATION
AcT §§ 1, 12 and United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10-12 (1970).
• 7 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975), aff'g per curiam 45 App.
Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974).
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firmed arbitral enforcement of a stipulated monetary remedy
that amounted to a penalty.8 Yet in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,9 the
court held that public policy forbids private punishment, and de-
clared that under no circumstances could an arbitrator award
punitive damages. Although Garrity did not involve a contractual
stipulation expressly authorizing the assessment of a penalty, the
court stressed that "[a]n arbitrator has no power to award punitive
damages, even if agreed upon by the parties."10
The patent inconsistency of Savin and Garrity highlights the
need for a more sophisticated approach to judicial review of the
arbitrator's remedial power. Both modern developments in con-
tract law and the flexibility of the arbitral forum require this re-
vised analysis. In some contractual relations, for example, private
punishment is both permissible and necessary." Applied to such
contracts, the sweeping rule of Garrity is simply incorrect.
Moreover, given the statutory limits on judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards, 12 it is usually impossible to determine whether an
arbitrator's award amounts to compensation or punishment. An
arbitrator may decide both the issue of liability and the measure of
damages free from the traditional formulations of causes of
action' 3 and judicial limitations on compensability.' 4 His findings
of fact are nonreviewable. 15 The arbitrator need not explain how
he reached his conclusion; a simple order that the defendant pay
the plaintiff is judicially enforceable.' 6 All these factors make the
rule of Garrity both inaccurate and unworkable.
'See note 41 infra.
9 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976), noted in 43 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 546 (1977).
1"40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (emphasis added). See
notes 46-50 and accompanying text infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 114-17 infra.
12 See note 5 supra.
3Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 677, 345
N.E.2d 565, 569-70, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (1976) (when considering applicable statute of
limitations, arbitrator need not define cause of action in terms of "contract" or "tort"). See
SCM Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 40 N.Y.2d 788, 793, 358 N.E.2d 1024, 1028, 390
N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (1976) (arbitration is "free from the requirements and expectations
familiar to judicial proceedings with respect both to the formulation of pleadings and
causes of action and to historical and current legal theories as to the availability of rem-
edies").
14 East India Trading Co. v: Halari, 280 App. Div. 420, 421, 114 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (Ist
Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953).
I- Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 383, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418,
419-20 (1972); Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 336-37, 174 N.E.2d 463, 466,
214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 359 (1961).
16See notes 118 & 142 and accompanying text infra.
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This Note proposes the use of a more complex analysis when a
court fears that parties have granted excessive power to an arbi-
trator. Careful examination of Savin and Garrity, in light of New
York case law and in comparison with federal arbitration cases,
suggests a number of factors that should replace the simple litmus
test (viz., punitive or not punitive) of Garrity. A court should con-
sider the nature of the contractual relationship involved (continu-
ing cooperation or short-term exchange) and the role of an arbi-
trator in providing salutary protection of expectations where the
legal system is inadequate. Moreover, a court must acknowledge
the arbitrator's peculiar competence to fashion extra-legal theories
of liability and compensation. 17
An analysis based on these concerns would more accurately
reflect the realities of an arbitrator's relationship to contract law
than does the simple rule of Garrity. More important, it would
promote predictability and reliability in arbitration. An arbitrator
who wishes to punish or to compensate noneconomic losses can
usually do so. He need merely cloak his rationale and calculations
in silence. Thus, the Garrity rule discourages explanation and ob-
structs judicial review in those few cases where it is really necessary.
To be effective, judicial supervision must be limited to those situa-
tions in which there exists no rational explanation of an award as
compensatory or permissibly punitive.
I
PENALTIES IN NEW YORK
A. Publishers' Association: The Traditional Rule
For more than twenty years, the rule of Publishers' Association v.
Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union'8 governed punitive awards in
arbitration. In Publishers' Association the Appellate Division vacated
17 For example, the New York statute making agreements to arbitrate specifically en-
forceable provides:
A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any exist-
ing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard to the justiciable character
of the controversy and confers jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it
and to enter judgment on an award. In determining any matter arising under this
article, the court shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is
sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7501 (McKinney 1963) (emphasis added).
18 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952), noted in 52 COLUM. L. REv.
943 (1952), 22 FORDuiAM L. REv. 202 (1953), and 66 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1953).
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an award of $5,000 conditional punitive damages assessed against a
striking union under a collective bargaining agreement that ex-
pressly permitted arbitral punishment. 9 The decision recounted
the wealth of judicial precedent denying punitive damages in con-
tract actions and argued that this precedent represented a strong
"public and legal policy. ' 2° The court stated that when an arbitral
award ordered violation of the penal law, enforced a usurious
agreement, or applied a statutory treble-damage right, public pol-
icy required vacatur.2 ' Thus, the policy against punitive damages,
even those provided for by agreement of the parties, likewise com-
pelled a court to overturn such an award. The court asserted that
the arbitration statute permitted this judicial intrusion:
It has been seen that in an action at law the court would not
send any such agreed measure of damage to a jury. The court
would rule that in such a case it would allow the actual, but not
the punitive, measure; and the test for statutory arbitration is a
controversy which "may be the subject of an action." (Civ. Prac. Act,
§ 1448)....
We are of opinion that the penalty provision of the contract
is unenforcible [sic] under any admissible theory under our law
22
Significantly, however, not all the precedent cited by the court
for vacatur on public policy grounds involved disputes that could
not be the "subject of an action. '23 Nor is it clear that the section of
the Civil Practice Act making arbitration agreements enforceable
provided a legitimate basis for judicial intrusion since the case in-
volved the limits of post-arbitration review.24 More important, the
19 "The contract pursuant to which the arbitration was had gave express authority to
the arbitrators 'to impose damages, money or other penalties upon any party hereto found
guilty of a violation' of the agreement." 280 App. Div. at 501, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The
award specified that the $5,000 in punitive damages "were not to be payable by the union
'unless and until' the [arbitration board] 'finds or awards' that the union has 'again' vio-
lated the contract, upon which finding the $5,000 shall 'instantly' become payable." Id. at
502, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (quoting arbitrators' award).
20 Id. at 505, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 406.21 1d. at 505-06, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
22 Id. at 507, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (emphasis added).
23E.g., Kingswood Management Corp. v. Salzman, 272 App. Div. 328, 70 N.Y.S.2d
692 (1st Dep't 1947). Kingswood struck down an arbitration award of attorney's fees, inci-
dent to an out-of-court settlement of a treble-damage claim under a rent control act. The
treble-damage claim was an exclusively judicial remedy under the statute involved. Clearly,
the daim could be the "subject of an action" and therefore was not excluded from arbitra-
tion by N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1448 (Clevenger 1952) (repealed 1962), set out in note 24
infra. Rather, the rent control statute creating the right precluded arbitration of that right.
24 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1461-1462a (Clevenger 1952) (repealed 1962) governed va-
[Vol. 63:272
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court's objection that arbitral awards of punitive damages would
amount to "an unlimited draft upon judicial power"25 suggests that
other grounds may have prompted the decision. For example, the
court may have felt that the public policy against contractual penal-
ties allowed it to ignore statutory limits on judicial review of arbi-
tration altogether. 6 Alternatively, the court may have been acting,
sub silentio, under the provision in the arbitration statute requiring
vacatur where "the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 27 The deci-
sion emphasized the court's inherent right to refuse to enforce
agreements and arbitral awards that exceed the power of contract.
Parties cannot grant, and arbitrators cannot exercise, such pow-
ers. 28 Thus, even though the Appellate Division claimed to find
statutory authority for its action, the overall tenor of the opinion
indicates that the court would have ignored the arbitration statute
altogether had the "subject of an action" language not been avail-
able. Publishers' Association established a rule that endured for more
than two decades: penalties were impermissible in arbitration and
would be overturned whether or not the arbitration statute au-
thorized vacatur.29
catur and modification of an award until 1963. Moreover, the "subject of an action" lan-
guage in § 1448 referred to submission of an existing dispute. Similiar language did not
appear in the portion of the statute governing agreements to arbitrate future disputes:
Except as otherwise prescribed in this section, two or more persons may sub-
mit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between
them at the time of the submission which may be the subject of an action, or they
may contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them and such
submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. § 1448 (emphasis added),
25 280 App. Div. at 503, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
26 See Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223,
289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968) (policy favoring consistent application of antitrust laws allows
court to withdraw antitrust claim from arbitrator despite lack of authority in arbitration
statute), discussed in notes 9 1-95 and accompanying text infra.
27 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1462(4) (Clevenger 1952) (repealed 1962).
28 280 App. Div. at 507, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
29 Publishers' Association was one of several cases invoking public policy as a ground for
vacatur without fully explaining the relationship between such an action and the arbitra-
tion statute: Courts invoke a number of theories to justify a public policy vacatur. One
theory is that the policy against a given result (e.g., punitive damages) outweighs the statu-
tory policy of leaving all issues of fact and law to the arbitrator. This balancing of state
policies characterized Savin and Garrity. When the balance tips against the arbitrator, courts
using this balancing rationale admit that they are acting outside of or in direct contraven-
tion of the arbitration statute. The language used in such cases recognizes that the court's
action is ' judicial intervention dehors the provisions of [the arbitration statute]." Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 363, 353 N.E.2d 793, 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (1976)
(dissenting opinion, Gabrielli, J.) (quoting Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Stekardis, 34 N.Y.2d
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B. Savin: The Rule Revised
The issue of punitive arbitration awards reached New York's
appellate courts again in Associated General Contractors v. Savin
182, 186 n.*, 313 N.E.2d 53, 54 n.*, 356 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 n.* (1974)). See National
Equip. Rental Ltd. v. American Pecco Corp., 35 App. Div. 2d 132, 135, 314 N.Y.S.2d 838,
842 (1st Dep't 1970) (alleged violation of fire department rules did not raise public policy
issue sufficient to override arbitration statute), aff'd per curiam, 28 N.Y.2d 639, 269 N.E.2d
37, 320 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1971); Meyers v. Kinney Motors, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 266, 268,
301 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172-73 (lst Dep't 1969) (arbitration award ordering employer to commit
unfair labor practice vacated despite lack of statutory authority for vacatur). Courts also
balance these policies when the issue submitted for arbitration (as opposed to the outcome)
is imbued with a strong public interest. See notes 84-95 and accompanying text infra.
A second approach finds statutory grounds for vacatur if the arbitrator "exceeded his
power." See N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAw § 751 1(b)(1)(iii) (McKinney 1963). A court invoking this
language may be using either of two arguments. First, the result that contravenes public
policy may lie beyond the power granted to the arbitrator by the agreement. A court might
draw this conclusion from either the construction given or the remedy ordered. See, e.g.,
Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Steuben, 50 App. Div. 2d 421, 425, 377
N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (4th Dep't 1976) (arbitrator's construction of contract that disregards
plain meaning of document exceeds his powers). This use of the statutory language
amounts to judicial redetermination of the merits. See notes 170-73 and accompanying text
infra. More aptly, some courts argue that punitive damages exceed the remedial power of
the arbitrator impliedly contemplated by the parties when they agreed to arbitration. E.g.,
Operating Engineers Local 450 v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
The alternative use of "exceeded his power" proceeds more directly. Rather than
looking to the power consensually granted, a court might argue that an arbitrator simply
does not have the power to violate state policy. Therefore, any award that is contrary to
state policy "exceeds his power." Associated Teachers, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 40 App.
Div. 2d 122, 125, 338 N.Y.S.2d 45, 49 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 33 N.Y.2d
229, 306 N.E.2d 791, 351 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1973). California courts employ the notion that
no order contrary to public policy is within the power of the arbitrator when they hold that
the arbitrator's action conflicts with the contract provisions of the Civil Code. Loving &
Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603, 609-10, 204 P.2d 23, 27 (1949). See Frame v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673-74, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (1971)
(refusing to stay arbitration concerning restrictive covenant but stating that arbitral en-
forcement of its purely anticompetitive aspects would be vacated as violating Civil Code
provision); California State Council of Carpenters v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. App. 3d 144,
157, 89 Cal. Rptr. 625, 633 (1970) (arbitrator lacks power to enforce "illegal" contract
provision but may decide legality initially, subject to judicial review).
Finally, there is a relationship, but not necessarily an exact congruence, between the
"exceeded his power" approach to vacatur and the threshold question of arbitrability (i.e.,
whether or not a given dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate). The Publishers'
Association court implicitly recognized this relationship when it looked to the arbitrability
section of the statute during post-arbitration review. Under New York procedure, a party
served with notice of demand for arbitration has 20 days in which to commence litigation
on the question of arbitrability. If he fails to meet this deadline, he may not challenge the
arbitrator's exclusive jurisdiction over the issues submitted. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 7503(c)
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976). Nevertheless, a court wishing to intrude upon the merits in
an action for confirmation of an award may claim that the arbitrator's conclusions relate to
matters outside the agreement and therefore "exceeded his power." Thus, a court may look
to the statutory language concerning initial arbitrability when considering whether an ar-
[Vol. 63:272
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Brothers.30 Savin, a heavy construction firm, was bound by the
terms of its membership in the contractors' association (AGC) to
bargain with labor only through the association. Faced with a con-
tinuing Teamster strike in April and May of 1972, Savin reached
independent agreement with the union. The AGC complained of
the breach and successfully sought an arbitral award based on the
formula stipulated in Savin's "designation agreement" appointing
the AGC as its sole bargaining representative:
[I]f the arbitrators should find that a signatory to the agreement
violated its obligations under the agreement, damages shall be
awarded to the AGC "in an amount no less than three (3) times
the daily liquidated damage amount [delay damages] provided
for in each such heavy and highway construction contract to
which the [signatory] is a party within the geographic area of the
applicable labor contract ... negotiated by AGC" for each day
that it was found to be in violation of its obligations under the
designation agreement .... 31
The arbitrator awarded damages of $104,000, three times the max-
imum loss that Savin might have sustained by waiting out the strike
with the rest of the AGC.
The trial court, confirming the arbitrator's award, held that
the stipulated remedy was a valid liquidation of damages. The
Appellate Division, however, concluded that the stipulation im-
posed a penalty,32 and therefore violated the Publishers' Association
bitrator has "exceeded his power" by deciding matters outside the scope of his jurisdic-
tion. In this light, the arguments of the court in Publishers' Association make more sense.
The court referred to the section of the arbitration statute dealing with the validity of
agreements to arbitrate when the issue before it was confirmation or vacatur of an award.
See note 24 supra. In so doing, the court implicitly argued that because only justiciable
controversies could be forced to arbitration under the statute, an arbitrator had no power
(jurisdiction) over nonjusticiable controversies such as demands for punitive damages.
Nevertheless, the holding of Publishers' Association is not limited to -this alleged statutory
authorization. The court relied on cases vacating arbitration awards without reference to
the language of the statute. See note 23 supra. Moreover, the "subject of an action" lan-
guage was only arguably applicable to the prior agreement to arbitrate involved in the case,
as opposed to submissions of existing disputes. See note 24 supra. Nor is it truly accurate to
treat a claim for punitive damages as the subject of an action; punitive damages are the
remedy sought in, not the subject of, some contract actions. Furthermore, the opinion as a
whole relies more on the equitable power to refuse enforcement of inequitable sanctions
than on the purported statutory limitation on arbitration.
30 45 App. Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d
957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975).
31 45 App. Div. 2d at 137, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
12 d. at 140-41, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 379. The Appellate Division's conclusion that "the
damage clause must be construed as imposing a penalty" (id. at 140, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 379)
1978]
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rule. 3 Nevertheless, the award survived judicial review. The court
pointed out that the revised arbitration statute made arbitration
"enforceable 'without regard to the justiciable character of the
controversy.' "3 Therefore, reasoned the court, the elimination of
the "subject of an action" language from the statute rendered Pub-
lishers' Association distinguishable. 35 By reading Publishers' Association
as relying solely on the "subject of an action" language, the Savin
court freed itself to balance the public policy favoring arbitration
against the public policy voiding penalties without according pre-
cedential deference to the latter.36 Although the distinction drawn
by the Savin court was dubious, it cleared the way for a more
sensible allocation of power between judge and arbitrator. 7 In
finding that the stipulated remedy was a penalty, the Savin court
relied heavily on the necessity of an in terrorem clause where breach
is irremediable in monetary terms. In the group-bargaining
context, 38 penalties functioning as "security for performance" are
the only adequate means of protecting the parties' expectation
interests.3 9 Only performance, ensured by the threat of punish-
ment, will make the parties whole. Recognizing that this punitive
was technically dictum since the court held that public policy did not bar an arbitrator's
enforcement of a penalty. Later decisions, however, have treated the award in Savin as
clearly constituting a penalty. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 357, 353
N.E.2d 793, 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1976).
33 45 App. Div. 2d at 141, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
34Id. at 142, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (quoting N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 7501 (McKinney
1963)).
35 45 App. Div. 2d at 141-42, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 380. See Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 App. Div. 500, 507, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 407 (1st Dep't 1952),
quoted in text accompanying note 22 supra.
36 Arguably, the change in the arbitration statute commanded the result in Savin. The
revisers not only removed the "subject of an action" language but also emphasized the
change by adding the language quoted in the text accompanying note 34 supra. The
change amounts to a further command of "hands off the merits." See 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc.
No. 13, at 131 (second report on revision of Civil Practice Act). Nevertheless, the Savin
court did not confront the full force of the rule in Publishers' Association and therefore did
not decide just how much force should be read into the statutory change.
37 See discussion of labor cases in notes 108-17 and accompanying text infra.
" The dispute in Savin did not involve "labor relations" in the traditional sense of
agreements between employer and employee. The parties were nevertheless involved in a
relationship requiring continuity of performance similar to that found in a collective bar-
gaining agreement-a contract that is occasionally breached, but seldom terminated, prior
to its expiration. Only by presenting a united front could the employers' association deal
effectively with the unions. Only performance could remedy a breach. See Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Savin Bros., Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 136, 144, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374, 382 (3d
Dep't 1974), aff'd per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975).
39 45 App. Div. 2d at 139, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (quoting Ward v. Hudson River Bldg.
Co., 125 N.Y. 230, 235, 26 N.E. 256, 257 (1891)).
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enforcement function was the parties' sole rationale for stipulating
the remedy, the court nevertheless upheld the arbitrator's award.
The very facts that proved it a penalty also demonstrated the need
for such a contract term. Having distinguished Publishers'
Association, the court perceived no public- policy overriding the par-
ties' need for private enforcement. Its decision thus established
that arbitrators need not follow the liquidated damages versus
penalties distinction, at least where the "volatile nature of labor
conflicts"40 requires judicial deference to the arbitrator's action.
The Court of Appeals, expressly adopting the majority and
concurring opinions of the Appellate Division, affirmed the judg-
ment in a per curiam decision.41 The affirmance reiterated the
notion that the goal of promoting labor peace outweighs the policy
against penalties42 and invoked the rule that an arbitrator's mis-
takes of law and fact are not subject to judicial review.43 Chief
40 45 App. Div. 2d at 144, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (quoting 52 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 945
(1952)).
41 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975). The per curiam decision
adopted a number of potentially contradictory justifications for affirming the Appellate
Division. First, the court adopted the majority opinion below, an opinion resting chiefly on
the necessity of punitive sanctions in continuing contractual relationships, i.e., labor con-
tracts. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra. The Court of Appeals also stated that
because the arbitrator had found that the award did not impose a penalty, and because an
arbitrator's decisions of law were nonreviewable, no problem of public policy existed. This
position not only conflicted with the rationale of the majority below (see note 32 supra) but
also contradicted the very notion of a public policy review (see note 43 infra):
The Court of Appeals also adopted the concurring opinion of Justice Herlihy in the
court below. His concurrence countenanced penalties so long as they were imposed pur-
suant to a previously agreed-upon formula, and distinguished Publishers' Association as not
involving preformulated punishment. 45 App. Div. 2d at 145, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
As explained below, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976), answered some of the questions left open by the per curiam affir-
mance. In Garrity, the Court of Appeals confirmed that Savin did indeed involve a penalty.
See note 32 supra. Moreover, Garrity belies any reliance upon Justice Herlihy's distinction
between penalties based on formulas and those that are not. See 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 360,
353 N.E.2d at 794, 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832, 834. Finally, this distinction, even if valid,
would not have saved the Savin agreement, which called for damages of "no less than" triple
the expected cost of performance. 45 App. Div. 2d at 137, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 376 (emphasis
added).
42 Arbitration here was in consequence of a broad arbitration clause in a field
of collective bargaining. In that field public policy favors the peaceful resolu-
tions of disputes through arbitration as contrariwise it looks with disfavor on the
exaction of penalties. There are involved no interests of third persons which can
be said to transcend the concerns of the parties to the arbitration .... [W]e
conclude that there is in this case no question involving public policy of such
magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion ....
36 N.Y.2d at 959, 335 N.E.2d at 859-60, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
4 3Id. The reference to the nonreviewability rule was a red herring. As explained in
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Judge Breitel dissented vigorously, 44 laying the groundwork for his
eventual triumph in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
45
C. Garrity: The Rule Reinstated
While the Appellate Division was striking a new balance be-
tween conflicting policies in Savin, author Joan Garrity was seeking
$45,000 in allegedly overdue royalties from her publisher.46 She
also asked that the arbitrator impose punitive damages for "mali-
ciously withholding royalties.., for the unjustifiable and vindictive
purpose of coercing plaintiff to withdraw" a prior suit for fraud.47
The arbitrator awarded the back royalties and $7,500 in punitive
damages. The trial court confirmed the award, and the Appellate
Division affirmed without opinion. 48  However, Chief Judge
Breitel, speaking for the Court of Appeals, vacated the award of
punitive damages.
The high court, citing Publishers' Association, enunciated a
sweeping rule: "An arbitrator has no power to award punitive
damages, even if agreed upon by the parties . Yet the court
avoided overruling Savin:
That case did not involve an award of punitive damages. Instead,
the court permitted enforcement of an arbitration award of tre-
ble liquidated damages, amounting to a penalty, assessed how-
ever in accordance with the express terms of a trade association
membership agreement. The court held that the public policy
against permitting the awarding of penalties was not of "such
magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion" . . . .In the instant
case, however, there was no provision in the agreements permit-
ting arbitrators to award liquidated damages or penalties. In-
deed, the subject apparently had never ever been considered.5"
note 29 supra, a public policy vacatur is an exception to the rule that an arbitrator's mis-
takes of law are nonreviewable. See notes 170-73 and accompanying text infra.
44 36 N.Y.2d at 959, 335 N.E.2d at 860, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 556. Judges Jasen and Ga-
briellijoined the dissent.
45 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
46 Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 48 App. Div. 2d 814, 370 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't 1975)
(mem.), modified, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
47 40 N.Y.2d at 361-62, 353 N.E.2d at 798, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (dissenting opinion,
Gabrielli, J.).48 Justice Capozzoli, in a brief dissent, argued that because the arbitration agreement
did not grant authority to award punitive damages, the arbitrator had exceeded his author-
ity, in addition to violating the rule of Publishers' Association. 48 App. Div. 2d at 814, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 7.
49 40 N.Y.2d at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (emphasis added).
5Id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 795, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
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Here the court purported to distinguish Savin on three grounds.
The prior case involved an express agreement to punish; 51 a for-
mula provided guidance as to the amount of punishment;52 and
the arbitrator in Savin characterized the award as liquidated dam-
ages rather than punishment.3 In addition, Savin's labor context
arguably distinguishes it from Garrity. Despite available factual dis-
tinctions, however, the rationale of Garity renders the two cases
irreconcilable. 4 At the root of the Garrity decision is the notion that
freedom of contract does not include the freedom to impose
penalties. 5  The remedial powers of arbitrators arise solely from
51 The dissent in Garriy, however, asserted that the contract's broad arbitration clause
impliedly empowered the arbitrator to grant punitive awards. The agreement incorporated
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Id. at 361, 353 N.E.2d at 798, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 835. The broad remedial provision provides: "The Arbitrator may grant any
remedy he deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties,
including, but not limited to, specific performance of the contract." AmERICAN ARBITRATION
AssoCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RuLns § 42 (1964).
52But see note 41 supra. The formula in Savin was exact only insofar as it specified a
minimum level of punishment.
53 But see notes 29 & 43 supra. A violation of public policy eliminates the nonreviewabil-
ity of an arbitrator's determinations of law.
"The three dissenting judges in Garrity recognized that the majority drew a distinc-
tion without a difference. The dissent stated:
The majority would distinguish the Associated Gen. Contrs. case (supra) upon
the thin ground that the enforcement of a treble liquidated damages clause which
was applicable to numerous nationwide contracts that conceivably could have
amoupted to astronomical sums is not the equivalent of the enforcement of an
award of penalty damages. However, as Mr. Justice Greenblott specifically stated
for the majority below in that case, and in an opinion expressly approved by this
court, the amount of damages therein computed in the arbitration bore "no reason-
able relationship to the amount of damages which may be sustained" (emphasis added...);
and a contract clause which is grossly disproportionate to the presumable damage
or readily ascertainable loss is a penalty clause, irrespective of its label .... In
short, Associated Gen. Contrs. is not only apposite but is controlling.
40 N.Y.2d at 363-64, 353 N.E.2d at 799-800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
5 "The law does not and should not permit private persons to submit themselves to
punitive sanctions of the order reserved to the State. The freedom of contract does not
embrace the freedom to punish, even by contract." Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 834.
Notably, Judge Gabrielli, who dissented in Savin, changed sides and drafted the strong
dissent in Garri,. His argument was not limited to the obvious stare decisis problems.
Rather, he espoused the Savin view that public policy does not deny the power to punish in
the arbitral context:
Controlling here, as [in Savin], is the fact that the arbitration clause is broad in-
deed; there are no third-party interests involved; and the public policy against
punitive damages is not so commanding that the Legislature has found it neces-
sary to embody that policy into law, especially one that would apply to all cases
involving such damages irrespective of the amount sought, the relative size of the
award, or the punishable actions of the parties.
Id. at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
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contract and are therefore limited to compensatory correction of
actual harm.56 According to the court, this rule necessarily follows
from the fundamental principle that the power to punish, like the
power to use force, is reserved to the state.57 Granting arbitrators
the power to punish would return society to economic barbarism
and would open the door to unlimited oppression of the weak and
unwary. 58 Even in cases where punitive damages might be available
from a jury, punishment by an arbitrator is impermissible. Jury
awards of punitive damages, unlike arbitral awards, are subject to
the safeguard of judicial review for "reasonableness." To subject
punitive arbitral awards to such review, however, would negate the
salutary speed and economy of arbitration.59
In essence, then, the Garrity award failed because private par-
ties may not contractually provide for any redress that goes beyond
compensation for economic loss. This rule sweeps beyond factual
distinctions to impugn the holding of Savin. Specifying a formula
for calculating an agreed-upon penalty cannot eliminate the con-
tracting parties' lack of power to agree on punishment in the first
place. The syllogism is simple: Parties cannot agree to punish each
other, even if they stipulate the exact measure of punishment.6 0
The sole source of an arbitrator's power is the agreement of the
parties. If parties may not agree to punish, then the arbitrator may
not enforce a stipulated punishment.
Since Savin was not overruled, however, New York law on the
issue of penalties in arbitration remains unclear. Moreover, as the
56 "It is also true that arbitrators generally are free to fashion the remedy appropriate
to the wrong, if they find one, but an authentic remedy is compensatory and measured by the
harm caused and how it may be corrected. Id. at 357, 353 N.E.2d at 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
832 (emphasis added).57 Id. at 358-60, 353 N.E.2d at 796-97, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34.
" The court quoted at length from Publishers' Association, including the language refus-
ing to countenance a grant of "an unlimited draft upon judicial power." Id. at 358-59, 353
N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
591 Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834. This argument was intended to
rebut the dissenters' points that the punitive amount was reasonable on the facts and that
reasonable punitive amounts ought to be allowed where an arbitrator is empowered to "do
justice." Id. at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (dissenting opinion, Gabrielli,
J.). See note 51 supra. The majority's contention that allowing punitive awards, subject to
judicial review, would increase the level ofjudicial intrusion into arbitration underestimates
the amount of "review" already involved in applying the "completely irrational" standard
of vacatur to all arbitrator actions. See notes 170-73 and accompanying text infra.
6 E.g., Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 521-22, 344
N.E.2d 391, 395-96, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459, 463 (1976); Ward v. Hudson River Bldg. Co., 125
N.Y. 230, 235, 26 N.E. 256, 257 (1891). The rule stated in the text reflects the universal
ban on stipulated remedies that exact penalties. See RESTATEMENT OF CotrrACTS § 339
(1932).
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next section illustrates, the rule of Garrity conflicts with established
principles regarding the relationship between arbitrators and
courts. The fundamental nature of this conflict necessitates a
search for a more workable rule.
II
Garrity IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF
ARBITRATION LAW
This section analyzes Garrity within the overall context of judi-
cial review of arbitration. Against this backdrop, the decision's
shortcomings are apparent. The principles of arbitral flexibility
and judicial deference to an arbitrator's superior knowledge of a
given business, the problems inherent in balancing statutory and
common-law public policies, the remedial needs of parties in con-
tinuing contractual relationships, and the judicial intrusion re-
quired to characterize an award as "punitive" or "compensatory" all
militate against applying the Garrity rule. Federal arbitration cases
dealing with the issue of punishment provide an instructive con-
trast. The comparison is sound, both because the general principles
of New York and federal arbitration law coincide and because the
applicable statutory provisions are nearly identical n.6 The relevant
federal statute-the United States Arbitration Act (U.S.A.A.)62 _
applies to all arbitration agreements involving "maritime trans-
actions" or "commerce' 6 3 that come before the federal courts.64
The Act was based on the New York Arbitration Law,65 which has
61 Under the federal statute, a court may overturn an award "[wihere the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1970). Under
the New York statute, an award may be overturned if "an arbitrator, or agency or person
making the award exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and defi-
nite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§ 7511(b)(1)(iii) (McKinney 1963). The application of this language to the public policy
issue is discussed in note 29 supra.
62 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1970).
63 1d. §§ 1-2.
6" Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1966). See
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). For discus-
sions of the peculiar federalism questions involved in a federal act that governs interstate
contracts in federal courts but not necessarily in state courts, see 60 CoLum. L. REv. 227
(1960), 45 CORNELL L.Q. 795 (1960), and 73 HARV. L. REv. 1382 (1960). Enacted prior to
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and operative as part of federal common law
prior to Erie, the U.S.A.A. has since been reinterpreted as federal substantive law. Grand
Bahama Petrol. Co. v. Asiatic Petrol. Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1324-26 (2d Cir. 1977).
11 S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). See Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d
190, 198, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856 (1973).
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since been revised and liberalized.66 Nevertheless, federal courts
applying the U.S.A.A. have had less difficulty than their New York
counterparts in adopting a hands-off attitude toward judicial re-
view.
A. Arbitral Flexibility and Limited Judicial Review
The Second Circuit case of South East Atlantic Shipping Ltd. v.
Garnac Grain Co. 67 aptly illustrates the relationship between the
rule enunciated in Garrity and the principle of arbitral flexibility.
In Garnac the shipper (Garnac) appealed from confirmation of an
arbitration decision awarding the carrier (Atlantic) the difference
between contract price and resale price. 68 Garnac claimed that At-
lantic had failed to take advantage of a clear opportunity to miti-
gate damages and that the arbitrators had excused Atlantic's fail-
ure to mitigate on moral rather than legal grounds. In Garnac's
view the amount of the award demonstrated that the arbitrators'
intent was to punish the breaching party rather than compensate
the aggrieved party.69 The Second Circuit explained:
[A]lthough the [arbitration] panel majority's opinion indicates
that they were morally outraged by Garnac's conduct.., the award
was not punitive. Moreover, we think it within the arbitrators' power
to consider such questions of business morality in determining whether
to award Atlantic the full extent of its loss regardless of whether
some of that loss, in retrospect, might have been avoided. Such
an award, however liberal, does not amount to an "unlawful"
assessment of punitive damages.70
The court expressly declined to decide, however, whether arbitral
damages could ever be so punitive as to require vacatur.7 1 Other
66 Both 1937 N.Y. Laws ch. 341 (amending N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 1448-1469 (Clev-
enger 1936)) and N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7501 (McKinney 1963) served to expand arbi-
trator jurisdiction and to limit judicial review.
67 356 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1966).
6
'1d. at 191. The contract had required Atlantic to nominate a vessel by January 1,
1964, to carry Garnac's grain later that year at a price of $15 per ton. Atlantic failed to
meet the deadline for naming a specific ship. Without giving prior notice of any concern
over the delay, Garnac repudiated the contract on January 2, claiming that failure to
nominate justified rescission. On January 4, Garnac offered to re-enter the contract at the
then current market rate of $12 per ton. Atlantic refused and some time later found other
hire at $8 per ton, nearly 50% below the original contract rate. The arbitrators found that
Atlantic's failure to nominate was a nonmaterial breach, and awarded the full difference
between contract price ($15 per ton) and rehire rate ($8 per ton). Id. at 190-91.
61d. at 191.
"°Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
71 [W]e [do not] find it necessary to determine whether an arbitrators' award could
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federal courts have displayed a similar reluctance to intrude upon
an arbitrator's method of calculating damages, stating that a mis-
take of law resulting in the imposition of legally unwarranted dam-
ages is nonreviewable. 2
Underlying Garnac is the notion that parties invoke arbitration
because an arbitrator steeped in the practice of a given trade is
better equipped than a judge to decide issues of both liability (i.e.,
what behavior transgressed the limits of acceptable practice in the
trade) and compensation (i.e., what losses are actually incurred by a
businessman in the given situation). Applying this notion, some
New York decisions have approved extra-legal remedies in the ar-
bitration context. 73 If arbitrators are to maintain this flexibility,
courts must limit their review of arbitration decisions. Both the
federal and New York statutes promote this principle by severely
limiting judicial review of the merits of an arbitrator's decision.7 1
Courts have followed the spirit of the statutes, stating that arbi-
trators may calculate damages according to 'Justice, '175 free from
rules of law and modes of analysis traditionally applied by courts. 6
be so clearly punitive as to exceed their contractual powers or to be otherwise
unenforceable. Under our limited scope of review of arbitration awards, we are
bound by the arbitrators' factual findings and by their interpretation of the con-
tract and of contract law.
Id. at 191-92 (footnote omitted).
72 Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.S.C. 1957) (refus-
ing to review award allegedly in gross excess of agreed measure of damages). Cf. Harbor
Island Spa, Inc. v. Norwegian America Lines A/S, 314 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(confirming arbitrators' enforcement of forfeiture clause as valid liquidation of damages,
even if award rested on "a misinterpretation of law or an insufficiency of supporting facts").
73 E.g., East India Trading Co. v. Halari, 280 App. Div. 420, 114 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1st
Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953). In Halari, faced with a
stipulated remedy provision allowing assessment of 2% to 10% of the market price prevail-
ing at breach in addition to the difference between market price and contract price, the
same court that decided Publishers' Association affirmed an award of the 2% penalty. Point-
ing to the arbitrator's possible awareness that traditional damages might not reflect the full
measure of injury, the court found the award to be within the boundaries of "compensa-
tion." "The limited additional authority and discretion given to the arbitrators, which pre-
sumably will be exercised conformally [sic] to the merits of a case, does not appear to have
any improper purpose and at least is defensible." 280 App. Div. at 421, 114 N.Y.S.2d at
95. See cases cited in note 176 infra.
74 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7511 (McKinney 1963).
7' Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 386, 278 N.E.2d 633, 636, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418,
422 (1972).
7' As the court stated in Garnac:
Here, the arbitrators were free to conclude that Garnac's repudiation of the con-
tract was unjustified, that Atlantic's duty to mitigate did not require it to accept
Garnac's offer of January 4, and that Atlantic's subsequent actions satisfied its
duty to mitigate. Although as an original matter we might not agree with their
resolution of particularly the latter two questions, the purposes behind the Arbi-
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Even the arbitrator's misuse of legal labels does not justify over-
turning an award where the result is within the realm of arbitral
flexibility.77 However, if there really is a limitation requiring that
awards be no more than compensatory, 8 traditional rules defining
compensation must be applied in every case of post-arbitration
review to determine whether or not the "punitive" line has been
crossed. Whether this examination follows the statutory rubric by
asking if the arbitrator has "exceeded his power, '7 9 or proceeds
without regard to the statute under the inherent power to enforce
"public policy," 80 the result is the very judicial intrusion and loss of
arbitral flexibility that the Garrity court decried in refusing to give
arbitrators the power to grant "reasonable" punitive damages.8 ' In
tration Act were to give arbitrators considerable latitude in resolving such contrac-
tual issues.
356 F.2d at 192. See Orion Ship & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petrol. Corp., 284 F.2d
419, 421 (2d Cir. 1960) (refusing to instruct arbitrators as to proper measure of damages);
Orion Ship & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petrol. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (same case on remand), aff'd, 312 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1963). "At the very most the
arbitrator's method of computation was an error of interpretation of law and it is well
settled that this is insufficient ground for refusing to confirm his Award." 206 F. Supp. at
781. The New York Court of Appeals is in accord:
Arbitrators may do justice. It has been said that, short of "complete irrationality",
"they may fashion the law to fit the facts before them"....
. . . Given the power of arbitrators to decide without being bound by the
substantive rules of law, their award may not be said to be either an excess of
power or an act of misconduct under the limited statutory grounds for undoing
an award ....
Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 386, 278 N.E.2d 633, 636, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422-23
(1972) (quoting Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 174 N.E.2d 463, 466, 214
N.Y.S.2d 353, 357-58 (1961)). See United Buying Serv. Int'l Corp. v. United Buying Serv.,
Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 75, 80-81, 327 N.Y.S.2d 7, 14 (1st Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d
822, 286 N.E.2d 284, 334 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1972). Notably, the court in Publishers' Association
thought otherwise:
[A] compelling inference must be drawn [from New York case law] that on the
question of the scope of their powers in respect of the measure of damage, arbi-
trators are held closely, not only to the language of the contract under which they
function, but to a consistency with general legal rules in respect of damage.
280 App. Div. at 506, j114 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (emphasis added). The language of Lentine,
quoted above, repudiates this assertion and lends support to the Appellate Division's ap-
proval of a penalty in Savin.
" Schine Enterprises, Inc. v. Real Estate Portfolio, Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 799, 801, 257
N.E.2d 665, 665-66, 309 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1970). See East India Trading Co. v. Halari,
280 App. Div. 420, 114 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1st Dep't 1952) (allowing assessment of damages
labeled a penalty on theory that they were conceivably compensatory), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y.
866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953).
7
' See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
79 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7511(b)(1)(iii) (McKinney 1963). See 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1970).
'
0 See note 29 supra.
" 40 N.Y.2d at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834. See note 59 and accom-
panying text supra.
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sum, the unbending rule of Garrity conflicts with the flexible nature
of the arbitrator's remedial power and requires a level of judicial
intervention contrary to established law.
B. Statutory Versus Common-Law Public Policies
The Garrity rule elevates a principle of contract law to the
status of a "public policy," justifying disregard of the arbitration
statute's limitations on judicial review.82 No other New York or
federal case so exalts a nonstatutory policy.83 In the federal courts,
even statutory policies generally bow to the commands of the
U.S.A.A. Normally, federal courts must stay judicial action when
one party invokes a valid arbitration agreement covering the sub-
ject of litigation, 84 and must compel a recalcitrant party to submit
to arbitration.8 5 Only disputes involving federal securities regula-
tion 6 and antitrust law8 7 implicate public policies of sufficient im-
8 2 See note 29 supra.
83 Admittedly, federal public policies are more likely than state policies to be embodied
in statutory commands. The state judiciary has a wider scope of supervision of society-
e.g., supervision of state contract law. This distinction, however, does not reduce the need
for limiting an apparently boundless tool of judicial intrusion to the most clearly defined
public concerns. More important, absent a need for judicial enforcement of a statutory
command (cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (securities claim withdrawn from arbi-
trator on ground that only judiciary should enforce securities laws)), courts should recog-
nize the arbitrator's ability both to determine the extent of an invasion of a publicly pro-
tected interest and to decide the legal question of the applicability of a policy's protection.
Hirsch v. Hirsch, 37 N.Y.2d 312, 333 N.E.2d 371, 372 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1975), which recog-
nized an arbitrator's ability to determine factually that a divorcee had no need for statutor-
ily guaranteed support, illustrates the former point. The Hirsch court refused to hold that
arbitrators are incapable of deciding alimony claims, despite the public policy implications
of the issues involved. The appellant spouse's ability to support herself, however, was not
at issue on appeal in Hirsch. Therefore, the weight given to an arbitrator's finding of fact,
as opposed to his ability to find the fact in the first place, was not decided in Hirsch.
To the extent that respect for the arbitrator's determination of law (i.e., his finding
that the stipulated remedy was not a penalty) is part of the rationale of Savin, there is
authority for deferring to an arbitrator's mistake of law despite serious public policy impli-
cations. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
84 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
85 d. § 4.
6 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). But cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974) (allowing arbitration of securities claim in substantially international transaction
subject to International Chamber of Commerce arbitration and Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, [1970] 21 U.S.T.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970)). One
recent case, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974), demonstrates the extreme liberality of judicial review
under the U.S.A.A. and the Convention. (The U.S.A.A. provides the rule of decision,
except when it conflicts with the Convention's less exhaustive provisions. 9 U.S.C. § 208
(1970).) In Parsons, the court upheld an arbitral award of consequential damages expressly
prohibited by the contract and incurred as a result of the six-day Arab-Israeli war.
87 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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portance to override the commands of the U.S.A.A. An agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes involving federal securities regu-
lation is deemed an attempt to waive a nonwaivable right to judi-
cial protection.88 Similarly, otherwise arbitrable disputes requiring
construction of antitrust laws may not be forced to arbitration be-
cause any decision under the antitrust statutes involves a "pervasive
public interest."8 9 These public policy exceptions to the U.S.A.A.
apply only to agreements to arbitrate future disputes; agreements
submitting preexisting disputes to arbitration do not transgress
public policy.90 In sum, only the most explicitly protective statu-
tory schemes provide grounds for evading binding arbitration.
Judge Gabrielli's dissent in Garrity emphasized this distinction
between statutory and nonstatutory policies. A statutory policy may
be so important as to preclude arbitration of an issue; the impact of
a wrong decision would be too great. In contrast, an error of con-
tract law does not affect a concern singled out by the legislature for
special judicial attention. 91 A seminal New York "public policy"
case involving arbitration of statutory interests, Aimcee Wholesale
Corp. v. Tomar Products, Inc.,92 drew the same distinction. Although
it withdrew an antitrust claim from arbitral jurisdiction, the Court
of Appeals clearly distinguished claims involving private contract
law from claims requiring construction of a statute designed to
protect the public. 93 The court pointed out that antitrust violations
have an economic impact on the public at large; breaches of con-
tract seldom do.94 Moreover, unlike antitrust cases, contract actions
88 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953).
89 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.
1968). See Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
men., 486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973).
90 Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1149-50 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
mem., 486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973). Moreover, some "public" statutory interests are not so
great as to preclude arbitration. Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14
(2d Cir.) (ban on arbitration of securities act claims not available to protect brokers), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1966) (arbitrator
allowed to determine effect of discharge in bankruptcy); Local 1115, Nursing Home Union
v. Hialeah Convalescent Home, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 405, 413-15 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (arbitrator
allowed to determine application of wage-price freeze).
9' 40 N.Y.2d at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
92 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
93 If the arbitrators here should decide wrongly that the goods were or were
not defective, the injustice done is essentially only to the parties concerned. If,
however, they should proceed to decide erroneously that there was or was not a
violation of the Donnelly Act, the injury extends to the people of the State as a
whole.
Id. at 627, 237 N.E.2d at 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
94 Id.
[Vol. 63:272
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION
rarely present unsettled questions of law.95 An arbitrator's in-
terpretation of contract law has little or no precedential value; its
impact is limited to the parties. In contrast, an arbitrator's decision
on a novel point of antitrust law may have an unintended impact
beyond the parties, precisely because the law is unclear.
In sum, the public policy protected in Publishers' Association and
Garrity, a policy derived from the common law of contracts, is
strange company for the clear statutory policies protected in Aimcee
and the federal cases. The principle of arbitral flexibility is a
statutory policy; traditional limits on consensual power are not.
Courts should therefore be slow to invoke a policy against punitive
damages to limit arbitrator action.
C. Arbitration Remedies in Continuing Contracts
Garrity arose out of a distinctly commercial setting,96 yet it
purports to establish a test applicable to all arbitration awards.9 7 By
failing to consider possible differences in the contractual context,
Garrity again misses an important mark. The wealth of federal
cases involving labor arbitration awards illustrates the importance
of contractual context in shaping arbitral remedies. Although the
standards governing review of the arbitrator9 8 and the express
goals of federal labor law99 distinguish such cases from the com-
mercial context, federal courts, confronted with commercial cases,
have been willing to take lessons from labor law. 100 Courts should
95 Id. at 628-29, 237 N.E.2d at 226-27, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 973. The antitrust claim in
Aimcee raised novel questions of law. Id.
96 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
97 See notes 49-59 and accompanying text supra.
9' [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
9' In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here arbitra-
tion is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has
quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agree-
ment, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements
has no place here.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
100 mhe principles governing labor and commercial arbitration cases are similar,
and we therefore consider the principles of Honold [a labor case] with respect to
the authority of the arbitrator to fashion an award and the scope ofjudicial review
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not ignore doctrines developed in the labor context when asked to
enforce "commercial" arbitration awards. Labor relations are con-
tractual relations. Admittedly, courts must respond to the distin-
guishing themes in the labor arbitration context: the importance
of avoiding disruptions in production'' and the parties' need to
continue to deal with each other under the collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, in the labor context, New York courts accept a
presumption of arbitrability' 02  and a broad implied remedial
power'0 3 not applicable in the commercial context.
Nevertheless, by extending labor rules to employer bargaining
associations, Savin recognizes that the rationale of labor cases ex-
tends beyond traditional employer-employee disputes. Further-
more, all contracts are characterized by some degree of continuity,
need for cooperation during disputes, and flexibility in perform-
ance.' 0 4 Remedies in a continuing contractual relationship neces-
sarily differ from traditional legal damages tailored to a defunct
transaction. The more continuing and cooperative a commercial
contract is, the more the parties need the initial flexibility provided
by an arbitrator10 5 and the breadth of privately enforced remedies
to be applicable in commercial arbitration cases as well. However, even though the
principles are similar, there are differences in the rigor ofjudicial review ....
Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1972). See M.
DOMKE, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 4-5.
"0" See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960), quoted in note 99 supra.
102 G.E. Howard & Co. v. Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 265 N.E.2d 747, 317 N.Y.S.2d 326
(1970).
103 BOAC v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 32 N.Y.2d 823, 299 N.E.2d 258, 345
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1973), rev'g mem. 39 App. Div. 2d 900, 334 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1972) (dissenting
opinion adopted on reversal).
114 See Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 737-44 (1974).
These characteristics of continuing contracts are but three of the more obvious elements
involved in long-term relations. Above all, the relational contract is unlike the pre-planned,
short-term exchange, which is the model transaction of traditional contract law. Because
the parties cannot completely map out a relational contract at its inception, they are likely
to use an arbitrator to fill inevitable gaps in planning. Where the parties foresee the need
for dispute resolution during performance, an arbitrator can undertake gap-filling that a
court would eschew. See notes 157-60 and accompanying text infra.
Ironically, judicial hostility towards arbitration (see note 1 supra) obstructs this private
development of contract law. The old notion that parties may not " 'oust the jurisdiction' of
the courts" (Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d
Cir. 1942)) by invoking arbitration has been legislatively overruled. The parties' need to
oust inapplicable contract law, however, is frustrated by judicial insistence that an arbitra-
tion award be explicable in terms of traditional contract theories. See notes 170-73 and
accompanying text infra.
105 For example, the use of arbitrators promotes continuity in construction contracts.
See American Institute of Architects, AIA Document A201 § 7.10 (1970) (standard form
agreement containing arbitration clause).
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allowed in the labor context. 10 6 Thus, commerical arbitration may
be more than a "substitute for litigation"107 and should not be
limited to the remedies of litigation. If the goals of a remedy per-
mitted in the labor context are applicable to a particular commer-
cial contract, a commercial arbitrator should have the discretion to
use that remedy.
In this light, federal labor cases are instructive both in their
rationale for approving punitive remedies and in the distinctions
they draw between different remedial theories, many of which
would be labeled "punitive" in the commercial context. One group
of federal cases holds that neither a court nor an arbitrator func-
tioning under federal labor law may award puniti, e damages.' 08 A
number of recent cases, however, have cast doubt on this limita-
tion. Some courts have confirmed arbitral awards that closely re-
semble punitive damages by finding the awards sufficiently
"compensatory."' 0 9 In Operating Engineers Local 450 v. Mid-Valley,
Inc. ,"o the court denied an arbitrator the power to impose punitive
damages absent an express contractual provision authorizing such
a remedy,"' yet permitted the use of conditional future punish-
ment to force compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.
In Mid-Valley the arbitrator awarded the union salaries that would
have been earned by union members had the employer complied
106 This remedial flexibility is legally recognized in other consensual arrangements. In
the professional baseball leagues, for example, the Uniform Player's Contract provides for
assessment of f'ies (contractual penalties) against players by the league or the Commis-
sioner. See Note, Arbitration of Grievance and Salary Disputes in Professional Baseball: Evolution
of a System of Private Law, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1049, 1059 (1975). Moreover, the contractual
relationship between team and league empowers the Commissioner to impose punitive
sanctions. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1219-26
(N.D. Ga. 1977).
"°
7 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960), quoted in note 99 supra.
108 Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970); Local 127,
United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962). But see Local
416, Sheetmetal Workers v. Helgesteel Corp., 335 F. Supp. 812, 815-16 (W.D. Wis. 1971)
(ban on judicial and NLRB assessment of punitive damages not necessarily applicable to
arbitrators), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974).109 See cases cited in note 130 infra.
110 347 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
111 The court explained:
Contracting parties do not normally agree to assess exemplary damages for a
breach of contract. Such damages being punitive in nature are rare in contract
law. Contractual consent to so drastic a "remedy" for simple breach cannot be
implied. Therefore, an arbitrator's assessment of punitive damages must be
grounded in express language. In this case, neither the contract clause nor the
simple question submitted suggest [sic] authority for exemplary damages.
Id. at 1109.
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with the collective bargaining agreement by maintaining the pre-
scribed crew to operate its machinery. Citing the lack of causation
(the union lost only dues, not full salaries) and the possibility that a
nonunion crew might have been hired, the court held that the
assessment of unpaid salaries up to the time of arbitration was not
compensatory and therefore was void as punitive. 112 Notably, the
lack of contractual authorization to assess penalties, and not the
punitive nature of the award, was the basis of vacatur. 3
More important, however, is the precedent the Mid-Valley
court established in confirming a portion of the award. The arbi-
trator assessed additional conditional damages of future unearned
salaries, payable to the union each week that Mid-Valley continued
to refuse to hire the required crew. The court held that such an
award is enforceable "[a]s a reasonable means of effectuating the
contractual intent." 1 4 In other words, an arbitrator may use dam-
ages that are not reimbursement for a provable injury to coerce the
employer into compliance with the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The court in Savin employed similar logic in upholding the
stipulated penalty assessed in that group-bargaining situation.
Three elements of Savin and Mid-Valley coincide: (1) actual injury
to the plaintiff could not be calculated in monetary terms; (2) per-
formance was essential to fulfillment of the parties' expectations
-money damages, even if calculable, could not remedy the loss
to the plaintiff; and (3) the court perceived a public interest in
continuing the contractual relationship sufficient to justify private
coercion. Given these factors, penalties may be not only permissible
but desirable. This view highlights the distinctions between Savin
and Garrity,a1 5 and suggests an additional factor to include in the
judicial analysis of arbitration remedies: Courts may distinguish
between continuing and discrete contractual relationships when
setting limits on arbitral coercion-by-agreement. 116 Precedent in
112Id. at 1109-10.
113 "[Ain arbitrator's error of law in assessing punitive damages is not sufficient reason
to reverse his decision." Id. at 1110. See also Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Michelson's
Food Servs., Inc., 545 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1976) (although not theoretically pre-
cluded in arbitration, punitive damages represent demand so unusual that employees must
raise demand at beginning of grievance procedure).
14 347 F. Supp. at 1109.
115 Recall that the penalties in Savin were necessary to force AGC members to ride out
the Teamsters strike together. Loss of unity in the AGC threatened the construction indus-
try with labor strife. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra. In contrast, author Gar-
rity had easily calculable lost royalties to protect., and her loss due to Lyle Stuart's breach
was of little public consequence.
I" This suggestion rests on the notion presented at the beginning of this section: Con-
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federal labor cases supports this distinction, not only under the
Mid-Valley rationale, but also in those cases enforcing penalty-wage
awards payable to the union where the employer fails to hire work-
ers required by the collective bargaining agreement. 117
D. Problems of Characterization: What Is Punitive?
Perhaps the most significant problem posed by the Garrity
rule is its requirement that a court characterize every challenged
award as either "compensatory" or "punitive." To do so, a court
must identify both the legal theory of liability and the remedial
theory applied by the arbitrator. Because arbitrators need not ex-
plain their awards, 1 8 the court must reconstruct the arbitrator's
rationale in the dark. Further, the arbitrator may draw upon any
mode of analysis that is not "completely irrational."'1 9 Assuming
that a rule of law followed in another state is at least arguably ra-
tional, the court must acquiesce even in the face of a theory of lia-
bility imported from some distant jurisdiction. 20 The following
discussion identifies the theoretical complexities involved in char-
acterizing an award. The problems revealed both impugn the wis-
dom of Garrity and suggest the basis for a more workable system.
Federal labor cases dealing with punitive awards suggest a va-
riety of remedial theories, any one of which may form the basis of
an arbitration award. Federal trial courts have had only limited
success in using Mid-Valley's notion of coercing the employer into
tracts, and the appropriate remedies for their breach, fall along a spectrum from the con-
tinuing relations of collective bargaining to the relatively discrete sale of goods. See
Macneil, supra note 104, at 737-44. The court in Savin recognized this idea, sub silentio, by
invoking the public policy in favor of labor arbitration even though the contract involved
collective bargaining only indirectly. See text accompanying note 40 supra.117 E.g., Local 369, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Cotton Baking Co., 514 F.2d
1235 (5th Cir. 1975) (award of unearned wages to union), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055
(1976); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 415 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1969),
cerL denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
118 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
119 National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377, 383, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305, 208
N.Y.S.2d 951, 955 (1960). See Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 278 N.E.2d 633,
635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1972); Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.,
25 N.Y.2d 451, 458, 255 N.E.2d 168, 171-72, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 940 (1969) (dissenting
opinion, Breitel, J.); notes 170-73 and accompanying text infra. The Third Circuit has
adopted the "completely irrational" standard (Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc.,
466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972)), perhaps giving some substance to the "manifest dis-
regard" test of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
120 See note 138 infra.
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compliance to justify awards that are openly labeled "punitive."121
Federal courts have, however, approved of jury awards, exceeding
the amount of lost wages, that either compensate the employee for
mental distress 122 or punish the malicious aspect of a breach that is
also tortious.' 23 Should an arbitrator take the same approach in
calculating damages, both of these theories would present prob-
lems to a court undertaking a Garrity characterization, as Garrity
itself shows. Plaintiff Garrity alleged both breach of contract and
tort claims before the arbitrator. The legal label "tort" does not
remove a dispute from an arbitrator's jurisdiction.124 Thus, the
121 E.g., Local 416, Sheetmetal Workers v. Helgesteel Corp., 335 F. Supp. 812, 816
(W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974). The district court
held that punitive damages are not necessarily barred as a matter of law. Rather, said the
court, the proper test is whether or not the award is "reasonable" and "draws its essence"
from the collective bargaining agreement. 335 F. Supp. at 815-16. See Butler v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Butler v. Local 823,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975). In Butler,
the district court had allowed punitive damages under a theory of necessary coercion:
[W]here the award is uniquely effective in changing or deterring particular arbi-
trary misconduct or a specific pattern of bad faith misconduct which has persisted
stubbornly, then an individual remedy must be appropriately fashioned in the
form of an award of exemplary or punitive damages.
374 F. Supp. at 754.
122 Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 982-85 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973).
123 Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 924 (1975). In reversing the district court's award of punitive damages (see note
121 supra), the Eighth Circuit recognized the rationale of coercing the employer into com-
pliance, and also acknowledged the possibility of a moral justification for a punitive award:
The Local's conduct was not the type of outrageous or extraordinary conduct
for which extraordinary remedies are needed .... Butler was not subjected to
threats of violence, harassment, physical abuse, or the scorn and ridicule of his
co-workers, and there was no showing that the Local acted with any malice di-
rected specifically at him .... The plaintiff did not establish that punitive dam-
ages were needed to deter future misconduct ....
514 F.2d at 454 (emphasis added).
124 Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 676, 345
N.E.2d 565, 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1976). Speaking for the court, Chief Judge Breitel
stated:
At the root of the problem in assessing the boundary line between arbitration
and dispute determination in courts of law is that in arbitration .. . the parties
submit to arbitration a complex of facts, however arranged, and not facts or-
ganized in the form of elements of causes of action at law....
It is also evident that a complex of facts in legal analysis may present a facet
of contract law, or tort law, of quasi-contracts, or equity jurisprudence. These are
legal concerns and legal definitional boundaries which prescribe the mode ofjudi-
cial dispute determination. These are not the concerns or the boundaries of arbi-
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arbitrator might have awarded damages for the emotional injury
involved, since intentional infliction of mental suffering is com-
pensable in tort.125 The arbitrator might also have decided that, in
a publisher-author relationship, emotional injury is a sufficiently
foreseeable result of breach to be compensable in contract.'2 6 Fi-
nally, the arbitrator might have based his award on the desire to
punish reprehensible conduct. Only this last theory is impermissi-
ble under Garrity. But the three theories produce the same result.
Without an exhaustive opinion by the arbitrator, a court's charac-
terization of such an award must be purely arbitrary. If a legally
correct explanation of an award is conceivable, the award should
stand.' 27 The principle of flexibility and limited judicial review
trational dispute determination, nor should they be made so indirectly.
Id. at 677, 345 N.E.2d at 569-70, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
125 W. PROSSER, TORTS §12 (4th ed. 1971).
126See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); RESTATEMENT OF CorTRACTs
§ 341 (1932). In California, the civil code limitation of contract damages to compensation
(CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970)) saddles the courts with their own Garrity rule. As a
result, they have overcome the foreseeability problem in cases involving a strong personal
element in the contractual relationship, thereby permitting quasi-punitive recovery for
emotional distress under the guise of consequential damages in contract. In Crisci v. Se-
curity Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1967),
the court awarded the insured damages for mental distress caused by her liability insurer's
failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer from a tort victim. The court pointed out
that the insured buys peace of mind as part of the insurance contract, and that mental
distress is therefore a foreseeable result of a breach of the contractual duty to accept
reasonable settlements within policy limits.
The insurance context is complicated, however, by the doctrine that breach of the duty
to settle is both a breach of contract and a tort. The Crisci decision stands, in part, on this
dual nature of the injury to the insured. Yet the court's reliance on the tort aspect of the
injury to justify compensation for mental distress is problematic-the insurer's actions did
not constitute bad faith, dishonesty, fraud, or concealment. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 176, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 16. Nevertheless, the court held that liability exists whenever the decision not
to settle is objectively unreasonable, no matter how genuine the insurer's good faith. Liabil-
ity arises out of "the implied covenant of good and fair dealing," not out of the "bad faith"
of the breach. Id., 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (emphasis added). The duty to
reasonably protect the interests of the insured in settlement negotiations results from an
implied promise. The standards for breach of that duty are those of contract, i.e., perfor-
mance or nonperformance. Absent fraud or bad faith, the label "tort" does little to distin-
guish the insurer's conduct from any other breach of contract.
Notably, the Restatement countenances damages for mental suffering only in cases of
"wanton or reckless" breach of a personal contract. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341
(1932). The Crisci decision thus breaks with traditional limits on damages both by finding
insurance contracts sufficiently personal and by compensating for mental distress where
the breach was unintentional.127 See Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 457-60,
255 N.E.2d 168, 171-73, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 939-41 (1969) (dissenting opinion, Breitel, J.);
note 142 infra.
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demands no less respect for the judgment of an arbitrator empow-
ered to "do justice. ' 28
The distinction between tort and contract theories is not the
only hurdle complicating the characterization process. The cases
discussed in this section illustrate at least five theoretical bases sup-
porting confirmation of an ostensibly punitive award. First, Garnac
suggests that arbitrators may freely modify the traditional expecta-
tion calculation of economic loss.129 Like Garnac, federal labor cases
often ignore problems of causation and uncertainty where the
wrong complained of is significant, such as an employer's breach of
a collective bargaining agreement that succeeds in driving a union
out of business.' 30 Second, expectation may involve noneconomic
consequential losses.' 31 Both as a nonreviewable error of law and as
a part of the power to do justice, an arbitrator may award conse-
quential damages unavailable in a court. 132 Third, punishment (i.e.,
an award unrelated to compensation) at the hands of an arbitrator
may amount to coercion to perform an agreement whose breach is
irremediable in monetary terms.'33 Such punishment is exemplary,
but only as between the parties. It provides only individual deter-
rence and does not usurp the state's power of general deterrence.
Fourth, arbitral punishment may merely remove unjust enrich-
ment from the pockets of the defendant, awarding the plaintiff an
extra-compensatory amount to deny the defendant the benefit of
his breach. This theory may justify Mid-Valley, as well as the many
cases enforcing stipulated penalty wages.' 34 In each case, the union
received the labor costs that the employer had unjustly saved by
"'See notes 73-77 and accompanying text supra.
1
2 9 See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
130See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Building Serv. Employees Local 252, 367 F. Supp. 760 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (confirming award of 50% of 20 years' estimated lost dues based on arbitrator's
calculation that, but for employer's breach, decertified union would have had 50% proba-
bility of survival). See also Local 369, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Cotton Baking
Co., 514 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1975) (award of unearned wages to union), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1055 (1976); Mogge v. District 8, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 454 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.
1971) (court would not disturb arbitrator's rough estimate of wages lost after wrongful
firing and elimination of position); College Hall Fashions, Inc. v. Philadelphia Joint Bd.,
408 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (award of unearned wages to union for disbursement to
members upheld as compensatory, even though arbitrator termed award "penalty").
131 Arbitrators in New York have an implied power to award consequential damages.
United Buying Serv. Int'l Corp. v. United Buying Serv., Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 75, 78-79,
327 N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (1st Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 822, 286 N.E.2d 284, 334
N.Y.S.2d 911 (1972).
'
3 2 See note 76 supra.
133 See notes 114-17 and accompanying text supra.
134 See, e.g., cases cited in note 117 supra.
[Vol. 63:272
19781 PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION 299
failing to abide by the collective bargaining agreement. Finally,
punishment may be predicated upon the defendant's mens rea.
Federal labor cases that look to the defendant's malice envision this
type of award, 135 which is available only where the breach involved
is also a tortious act. Although an arbitrator may have jurisdiction
over a wrong justiciable in either tort or contract, 36 the Garrity
court's declaration that pure retribution is reserved to the state 37
precludes an award that looks only to the defendant's state of
mind. Where tort and contract claims are mixed,'38 however, this
rule requires a separate judicial trial on essentially the same facts
-an obviously wasteful exercise. This result is particularly ironic
given the Garrity court's espoused aim of preserving economy in
dispute resolution. 39
To do justice to the dispute-resolution mechanism chosen by
the parties, a court must consider this spectrum of theoretical bases
for "punitive" awards. Yet, as noted above, such detailed analysis
conflicts with the notions of flexibility and limited judicial review
that suffuse arbitration law.' 40 Fundamental problems in char-
acterizing an award lurk beneath the ostensibly simple rule of Gar-
rity. A rule more sensitive to these conceptual tangles would pro-
vide a more appropriate method of limiting arbitral action.
135 E.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 454 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975), discussed in note 123 supra.
136 See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
137 40 N.Y.2d at 359-60, 353 N.E.2d at 796-97, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
1 I The commingling of tort and contract claims is especially intimate in insurance
fraud and other consumer fraud cases. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., 11 Cal.
3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1974); Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54
Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1976); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America,
265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968). These and other California cases have
allowed both contractual recovery and punitive damages for fraudulent inducement. Be-
cause an arbitrator in New York is not bound to follow New York law, he might well apply
the rationale of these cases to an arbitration brought in New York. It would be difficult to
claim that following the logic of the California courts is "completely irrational." See notes
170-73 and accompanying text infra. Under the New York rule on punitive damages, how-
ever, an insurer may confine the contract claim to arbitration while forcing a separate
court suit on the claim for punitive damages for fraud. The plaintiff in Garriy was forced
to fragment her claim in this fashion. The net result is often to insulate those engaging in
fraudulent practices from adequate supervision by either court or arbitrator, both because
the likelihood of succeeding on a claim for fraud seldom justifies a separate lawsuit and
because the proceedings before the arbitrator might render the fraud claim res judicata.
Cf. Rochester Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Rios, 68 Misc. 2d 520, 522, 327 N.Y.S.2d 285,
287 (Rochester City Ct. 1971) (resjudicata principles apply to arbitration decisions).139 See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
40 See notes 73-77 and accompanying text supra.
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III
A PROPOSED ANALYSIS: WORKABLE LIMITS ON THE
REMEDIAL POWER OF ARBITRATORS
The issues identified in the preceding section teach two les-
sons: The Garrity rule is unworkable, and the policy it promotes-
purely compensatory arbitral awards-is undesirable. Garrity is un-
workable both because arbitral flexibility makes it impossible to
distinguish compensation from punishment, and because the ad
hoc process of balancing the arbitration statute's policies against
common-law rules of contract leads to unpredictable results. 4'
Moreover, a rigid rule against private punishment actually reduces
the efficacy of judicial review; an arbitrator may disguise his award
by giving no reasons for his decision.' 42 Had the arbitrator in Gar-
rity awarded damages without explanation, he would have made, at
worst, a nonreviewable mistake of fact. 143 Paradoxically, absolutely
prohibiting arbitral punishment actually increases the judicial ef-
fort necessary to ferret out those awards that are impermissibly
punitive, thereby defeating the very economies that Garrity sought
to promote.' 44
Nevertheless, courts called upon to give the force of a judg-
ment to a private arrangement must draw a line to avoid "an unlim-
ited draft upon judicial power."'' 45 This line may really be a vari-
able standard, as is suggested by the notions that some contractual
relationships do require private coercion and that arbitrators famil-
iar with an industry are often more able than judges to identify the
141 One need merely compare the results in Savin and Garrity to reach this conclusion.
See note 83 and accompanying text supra; notes 171 & 176 and accompanying text infra.
142 The court's demand for explanations in Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson
Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969), seems to have
dissipated in the wake of Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 278 N.E.2d 633, 328
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1972). In both cases, the court could conceive of a rational explanation for
an unusual award. In the latter case, the court did not ask the arbitrator to explain his
decision. See Torano v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 356, 243
N.Y.S.2d 434 (1st Dep't 1963) (unusually small award confirmed without arbitrator's ex-
planation of rationale). The "no opinion" rule is firmly established in the federal courts.
Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). See note 118 and accompanying
text supra.
143See Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 383, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634, 328 N.Y.S.2d
418, 419-20 (1972); Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 336-37, 174 N.E.2d 463, 466,
214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 359 (1961).
1 "See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
145 Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358, 353 N.E.2d 793, 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d
831, 834 (1976) (quoting Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280
App. Div. 500, 503, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1st Dep't 1952)).
[Vol. 63:272
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION
need for coercion. This section will suggest such a standard based
upon fundamental precepts of contract law. Because an arbitrator
functions as an extra-judicial means of protecting promise, he is in
many ways like any other stipulated remedy; courts should there-
fore impose limits on his powers analogous to the limits imposed
on other agreed remedies. This approach would fit the arbitrator
into the overall scheme of contract remedies, while requiring little
change in the present system of judicial review of arbitration.
A. The Purpose and Limits of Stipulated Remedies
Traditional contract rules limiting stipulated remedies to com-
pensation are often justified on two grounds. First, notions of fair-
ness dictate that parties should be protected from overreaching
and unfair dealing. 146 Second, contract theory tells us that penal-
ties are "not of the essence of the agreement" but are "in the
nature of a security for performance.' 1 47 The first argument de-
picts the rule against penalties as an extraordinary intrusion into
freedom of contract.' 48 The second argument, however, suggests a
different analysis.
A number of scholars have suggested that an underlying jus-
tification for contract as a legal institution is the promotion of
economic exchange. 49 Exchange is essential in any society where
different men produce different goods and services for future
trading. A traditional expectation remedy has its base in this notion
of promoting exchange. In effect, traditional compensatory con-
tract remedies seek to complete the exchange for the aggrieved
party, 1 0 thereby promoting reliance on promises of future ex-
change. A stipulated penalty is "not of the essence of the agree-
146 "'To allow of the use of penalties as damages, at the unlimited discretion of the
parties, would lead to the most terrible oppression in pecuniary dealings.'" Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Savin Bros., Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 957, 962, 335 N.E.2d 859, 861, 373
N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (1975) (dissenting opinion, Breitel, C.J.) (quoting Hoag v. McGinnis, 22
Wend. 163, 166 (N.Y. 1839)). See C. McCoaMICK, DAMAGES §147 (1935); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
147 Ward v. Hudson River Bldg. Co., 125 N.Y. 230, 235, 26 N.E. 256, 257 (1891). See 5
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1057 (1964); 5 S. WIU.xSTON, CONTRACTS § 776 (3d ed. 1961).
148 Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 495 (1962).
149 See, e.g., J. MuRRAY, CONTRACTS § 1 (1974); Macneil, supra note 104, at 700-01.
1' A contract is a promise given legal sanctions adequate (1) to protect proven
reliance on the promise by the promisee; (2) to prevent gain by default on the
promise, and (3) to effectuate expectancies created by the promise (a) where there
may be hidden or unprovable reliance or (b) where socially desired reliance may
thereby be promoted.
Macneil, supra note 148, at 497 (footnotes omitted). See note 104 supra.
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ment" because societally, and therefore legally, significant agree-
ments encompass exchange and no more. Society's only interest in
promoting reliance is to encourage continued specialization of
labor through exchange. Thus, the public policy against penalties
does not intrude upon freedom of contract; it is merely another
facet of the description of societally encouraged promise.
Traditional approval of liquidated damages also follows this
analysis. Broadly phrased, an enforceable stipulated remedy arises
when the parties foresee that damages at breach would be difficult
to calculate (or perhaps to prove), and the amount stipulated is a
reasonable estimate viewed from the time of contract formation. 151
When we look to the difficulty of calculation or proof of damages
to justify the use of a stipulated remedy, we expressly recognize the
power of the parties to shore up inadequate legal protection of
their expectation interests. This power to improve upon legal pro-
tection of promise, however, is limited. Under the requirement of
"reasonableness," the agreement must not deviate excessively from
the calculation of economic loss that contract law would have dic-
tated. Herein lies a paradox: The, parties may shore up legal pro-
tection of promise, but their extra-legal remedy will be judged by
reference to the very contract law whose inadequacy forced them
to stipulate a remedy in the first place. The result is a tension
between freedom to prescribe remedies that stretch the law of con-
tract and contract law's limit on that freedom. The limit demands
that the agreed remedy reasonably approximate what society has
deemed necessary to promote reliance on promise.' 52 Thus, a
court might ask of any stipulated remedy: Does this agreement
protect those societally useful expectation interests that legal rem-
edies seek to protect, even though such protection might not be
available in court?
B. The Arbitrator as a Stipulated Remedy
Modern arbitration statutes 153 provide legislative authorization
for supplementing the protection of promise available in court.
Just as a valid liquidation of damages allows the parties to pro-
vide a remedy, 54 an arbitration clause allows the parties to provide
an entire dispute-resolution mechanism. As a stipulated remedy,
151 U.C.C. § 2-718(1); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
152 Macneil, supra note 148, at 496-98.
153 See note 1 supra.
154 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1062 (1964). See 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 783 (3d
ed. 1961).
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arbitration adds to the protection of promise in a number of ways.
Courts commonly laud arbitration as a way to avoid the time, ex-
pense, and difficulty of litigation, 155 all of which detract from judi-
cial protection of promise. Similarly, the merchant-arbitrator
brings extra-judicial, specialized understanding to a dispute in his
business. 15 6 Most important, the use of arbitration allows the cre-
ation of a binding, but less than fully specified, continuing contrac-
tual relationship.15 7 Courts explicitly approve of this function in
the labor context when they speak of the arbitrator's role in de-
veloping the "common law of the shop."'158 The arbitrator is the
medium through which a private, contract-created society develops
its own law.' 5 9 The arbitrator can add previously unspecified con-
tent to promise, giving the parties an ability to create a binding
agreement whose terms can be specified in the future. Thus, the
arbitrator stretches traditional notions of consent and exceeds the
protection of promise available in court. 60 Arbitrators may stretch
traditional notions of consent as long as their conclusions are not
"completely irrational.' 6 1 Thus, compared to simple stipulated rem-
edies, 62 arbitration provides contracting parties with far more than
the traditional protection of promise. To be "completely irration-
al," the arbitrator must stray a long way from traditional contract
law, which provides the standard of rationality. 6 3
Finally, because the ability to fill gaps in promise is often valu-
able only insofar as it serves to guarantee the continuity of a con-
tractual relationship, the arbitrator must have some means of en-
forcing compliance with the terms he has specified. Conceivable
means include the individual deterrence of coercion-to-perform
approved in Mid-Valley164 and the general deterrence of punishing
155 See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359, 353 N.E.2d 793, 796, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (1976). See generally M. DoMKE, supra note 1, § 2.01, at 10-11.
158See South East Ad. Shipping Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., 356 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir.
1966); East India Trading Co. v. Halari, 280 App. Div. 420, 421, 114 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94-95
(1st Dep't 1952), aff'd mer., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953). See also note 176 and
accompanying text infra.
M5 7 See note 104 supra.
158 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960)
(quoting Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1499 (1959)).
"'
9 See Note, supra note 106, at 1054-65.
160 Arbitration is not the only area of the law in which traditional notions of consensu-
ality are changing. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207 (formation of contract).
6' See cases cited in note 119 supra.
182 See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra.16 3 See notes 170-73 and accompanying text infra.
'
8 4 See notes 110-14 and accompanying text supra.
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one member of a contractual society approved in Savin.165 Yet
Garrity tells us that even though the arbitrator may deviate from
traditional contract law in other situations, he is bound to uncom-
promising compliance with the "no punishment" rule when for-
mulating remedies. Applying the analogue of the limits on tradi-
tional stipulated remedies, however, one might ask instead whether
the outcome of a stipulated dispute-resolution mechanism reason-
ably approximates the protection of societally useful reliance on
promise that would have been provided in court. 166 As with judicial
review of the reasonableness of a stipulated monetary remedy,
this question ultimately focuses on whether the award is reasonably
necessary to the promotion of exchange, since promotion of ex-
change is the goal of contract remedies.' 67
C. The Traditional Language of Judicial Review
This view of an arbitrator's remedial power, a power larger
than that countenanced by traditional contract law but limited by
reasonableness, does not fit neatly within the language of review
used by New York courts. The Garrity court decried judicial review
of the reasonableness or justness of an award. 168 Moreover, New
York's arbitration statute says nothing about reasonableness of
awards.' 69 Nevertheless, courts review for reasonableness any
16 5 See notes 38-40, 115-17 and accompanying text supra.
166See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra. This argument accords with Judge
Gabrielli's dissent in Garrity. He argued that the award of punitive damages should be
affirmed because the arbitrator's action was far from "irrational." 40 N.Y.2d at 365, 353
N.E.2d at 800, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 838.167 See text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
161 40 N.Y.2d at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
"I N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAw § 7511(b) (McKinney 1963) formulates the only statutory
grounds for vacatur of an award:
1. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either par-
ticipated in the arbitration or was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if
the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by:
(i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or
(ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the
award was by confession; or
(iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his
power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made; or
(iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party apply-
ing to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of the
defect and without objection.
2. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who neither par-
ticipated in the arbitration nor was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if
the court finds that:
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award opposed by the losing party in arbitration. The courts begin
with the proposition that "arbitrators are not bound by principles
of substantive law or rules of evidence."' 70 This does not signify,
however, that a mysterious process producing justice takes place
without reference to contract law once the court finds that the
parties entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement. In every
case in which arbitral freedom is propounded, the court still per-
forms a contract analysis-considering the merits without "review-
ing" them.' 7' The pronounced standard of vacatur is "complete
irrationality."'' 72 The touchstone of rationality is contract law; there
is no other standard to apply. Thus, despite declarations to the
contrary, 73 courts in fact review arbitration awards for reason-
ableness; they simply apply a very loose standard of how much
unreasonableness is permissible. The analogy between review of
stipulated remedies for reasonableness in relation to contract law
and review of arbitration awards for complete irrationality in rela-
tion to contract law correctly reflects what the courts do, if not what
they say.
(i) the rights of that party were prejudiced by one of the grounds
specified in paragraph one; or
(ii) a valid agreement to arbitrate was not made; or
(iii) the agreement to arbitrate had not been complied with; or
(iv) the arbitrated claim was barred by limitation under subdivision (b) of
section 7502.
170 Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418,
421 (1972).
171 See Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 278 N.E.2d 633, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1972);
Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E.2d 168, 306
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969); Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. County of Steuben, 50 App. Div. 2d
421, 377 N.Y.S.2d 849 (4th Dep't 1976); Riccardi v. Modem Silver Linen Supply Co., 45
App. Div. 2d 191, 356 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Ist Dep't 1974), aff'd mein., 36 N.Y.2d 945, 335
N.E.2d 856, 373 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1975). Riccardi illustrates another difficulty with arbitral
involvement in matters of public policy. The petitioner in that case moved for a stay of
arbitration on the ground that the restrictive covenants in an employment contract violated
both the public policy embodied in the antitrust laws (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1968) and the common-law public policy against unreasonable restraints. In refusing
to stay arbitration the Appellate Division was careful to distinguish the issues: "[T]o the
extent that the petition rests upon claims of common-law unconscionability, such does not
raise issues to be preliminarily determined by a court, but rather, those issues are for the
arbitrators to decide." 45 App. Div. 2d at 196, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 878. Only the alleged
antitrust violations concerned the court. The Court of Appeals, however, confused the
issues when it affirmed: "The contention of illegality here is insubstantial since on its face
the restrictive covenant does not violate the common-law rules applicable to restraints in
employment opportunities .... 36 N.Y.2d at 947, 335 N.E.2d at 856, 373 N.Y.S.2d at
552.
1
7 2 See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
1
7 3 See text accompanying note 168 supra.
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D. Proposed Analysis of Punitive Awards
On the strength of this analogy, a reviewing court should ask
whether an arbitral award that goes far beyond traditional contract
remedies is still reasonably necessary to protect the societally useful
exchange aspects of the promise involved. Because traditional con-
tract remedies are, by definition, those aimed at protecting ex-
change, the same standard might be phrased: Is the award reason-
able, viewed from the perspective of contract law? The answer to
this question requires recognition of the varying kinds of contracts
in which arbitration may be invoked 174 and of the evolution of
contract remedies in other judicial forums. 175 In support of this
proposed standard, one may look to the deference that New York
courts have shown in the past for the arbitrator's superior knowl-
edge of the type of remedy reasonably necessary to protect ex-
change.'76 Moreover, the current draft of the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act reflects this deference in its proviso that "the fact that the
relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court
of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm
the award.' ' 77
Admittedly, this intensive review will require judicial effort.
Given the arbitrator's freedom to disguise the grounds for his
decision,17 8 however, the flexible rule is the only way to insure that
noncompensatory awards will be labeled as such and their justifica-
tions explained. Moreover, a court might devise a systematic
analysis for apparently noncompensatory awards that would speed
review and guide arbitrators. The following might serve as a model
for such an analysis:
(1) Did the parties agree to an expanded remedial power?
The agreement may be express, in the form of a specified formula
or simple authorization of "punishment," or may be implied from
circumstances where continuity of the contractual relationship was
clearly within the parties' expectation. Absent such an agreed ex-
"7
4 See notes 104 & 116 and accompanying text supra.
171 See notes 126 & 138 supra (development of remedies in California insurance and
consumer fraud cases).
176 See Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d
377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960) (arbitrator's order of specific performance of construction
contract confirmed); Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (arbitrator's order of specific performance of personal service contract
confirmed); Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785
(1958) (arbitrator allowed to enjoin strike where statute banned such action by courts).
177 UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 12.
178 See notes 142-43 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 63:272
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION
pansion, the award exceeds the powers of the arbitrator,1 7 9 and
should therefore be vacated.
(2) Is there any basis for characterizing the award as compen-
satory? As explained above, awards that are apparently punitive
may represent: (a) unusual calculations aimed at compensating loss
of economic expectation; 80 (b) compensation for such imponder-
ables as mental distress and for the cost of litigation;' 8' or (c) com-
pensation for a breach that is also a tort.'8 2 An award that fits one
of these categories should not be vacated.
(3) If the award is truly noncompensatory, does it: (a) remove
a benefit from the breaching party and transfer it to the aggrieved
party even though the latter's loss is less than the former's gain;' 83
or (b) coerce a party to perform where performance is the only
alternative to irreparable harm?' 84 If the answer to either of these
questions is "yes," the court arguably should allow the award to
stand. Meeting either standard suggests that the award passes the
fundamental test of contract remedies-it is reasonably necessary
to protect societally useful exchange.'8 5 A court applying this test
must evaluate both the public and the private need for contin-
uity in the exchange relationship. If either is sufficiently strong,
the award should stand. Thus, where continuity of the union-
management relationship is important to the public, as well as to
the union member, the arbitrator may assess penalty wages under
standard (3)(a). 86 Similarly, the Appellate Division in Savin
approved the punitive award because it met standard (3)(b). 87
Moreover, New York courts should recognize standard (3)(b) as a
valid way to reconcile Savin and Garrity. The continuity of the
1
7 9 See note 29 supra.
ISO See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
"'
1 See notes 73, 126, 131-32, and accompanying text supra.
182 See notes 122-25 and accompanying text supra.
IS' See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
184 See notes 114-17 and accompanying text supra.
'
8 5 See text accompanying notes 150-52, 166-67 supra. Removing unjust enrichment
(standard 3(a)) is the first cousin of pure coercion (standard 3(b)). Both remedies promote
societally useful exchange insofar as they induce continuing performance. Removing unjust
enrichment is merely a fine-tuned form of coercion, in that it eliminates the possibility of
profiting from breach. It does, however, have the additional justification found in tradi-
tional notions of fairness. Although such moral grounds for the remedy are unrelated to
the utilitarian model of contract remedies propounded in the text, they may reinforce a
court's willingness to confirm an award that fits standard 3(a).86 See notes 117 & 130 and accompanying text supra.
187, '[Tlhere may be a positive need for power in the arbitrator to impose and enforce
a penalty."' 45 App. Div. 2d at 144, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (quoting 52 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 943,
945 (1952)).
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relationship between author and publisher in Garrity is arguably
less important to the public, and its breach less irremediable in
monetary terms, than is the relationship of the members of an
employers' bargaining association, where private coercion may be
necessary to achieve social goals.
This analytical framework should replace the all-or-nothing
rule of Garrity. As with other applications of the "completely irra-
tional" standard, this approach would reflect the impossibility of
applying a rigid rule of law to a flexible process free from rules of
law. Moreover, the nearly impossible burden of disproving in
court all rational explanations for an award would encourage the
parties to rely on the forum they chose originally: arbitration.
CONCLUSION
Two recent cases in New York's highest court, Associated Gen-
eral Contractors v. Savin Brothers and Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,
reached conflicting results concerning an arbitrator's power to
punish a breaching party. Savin allowed an arbitrator to enforce a
stipulated remedy amounting to a penalty. Garrity, however, va-
cated an award of punitive damages and announced a sweeping
rule banning any punishment by contract. The rule is a line drawn
upon water. It is often impossible to distinguish between compen-
sation and punishment at the hands of an arbitrator. More impor-
tant, the law of arbitration must recognize both the remedial flexi-
bility of the arbitrator in determining the subject and the amount
of compensation, and the need of the parties in a continuing con-
tractual relationship to invoke greater protection than that pro-
vided by traditional legal remedies. An arbitrator is more than a
convenient and efficient combination of court and jury. In many
cases, arbitration functions like a stipulated remedy, protecting
contract interests in ways the traditional law of contracts cannot or
will not do. Therefore, a rigid rule against punitive damages in
arbitration cannot and should not guide judicial review of arbitral
action. Instead, in cases where the parties have empowered the
arbitrator to impose noncompensatory awards, courts should look
to the fundamental purpose of contract remedies-the protection
of societally useful exchange-and should test an arbitral remedy
by asking whether it is reasonably necessary to protect the ex-
change relationship in question.
Richard P. Hackett
[Vol. 63:272
